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Abstract. The article examines developments in the marketisation and privatisation of the English 
National Health Service, primarily since 1997. It explores the use of competition and contracting out 
in ancillary services and the levering into public services of private finance for capital developments 
through the Private Finance Initiative. A substantial part of the article examines the repeated 
restructuring of the health service as a market in clinical services, initially as an internal market but 
subsequently as a market increasing opened up to private sector involvement. Some of the 
implications of market processes for NHS staff and for increased privatisation are discussed. The 
article examines one episode of popular resistance to these developments, namely the movement of 
opposition to the 2011 health and social care legislative proposals. The article concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of these system reforms for the founding principles of the NHS and the 
sustainability of the service 
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[es] Mercado reforma y privatización en el Sistema Nacional de Salud inglés 
 
Resumen. El artículo examina la evolución de la mercantilización y la privatización del Sistema 
Nacional de Sanidad (SNS) en Inglaterra, sobre todo desde 1997. Explora el uso de la competencia y 
la subcontratación de servicios auxiliares y el uso en los servicios públicos de financiación privada 
para desarrollos de capital a través de la Iniciativa de Financiación Privado. Una parte sustancial del 
artículo examina la repetida reestructuración del sistema de sanidad como un mercado de servicios 
clínicos, inicialmente como un mercado interior sino posteriormente como un mercado creciente 
apertura a la participación del sector privado. Algunas de las implicaciones de los procesos de 
mercado para el personal del NHS y de creciente privatización se discuten. El artículo examina un 
episodio de la resistencia popular a estas tendencias, es decir, el movimiento de oposición a la salud y 
las propuestas legislativas del SNS en 2011. El artículo concluye con una discusión de las 
consecuencias de estas reformas fundamentales del sistema nacional de sanidad y la sostenibilidad del 
servicio. 
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This article examines key developments in marketisation and privatisation in the 
English National Health Service (NHS). The paper does not attempt an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the reforms but will assess their significance more broadly, 
including some of the implications for the workforce and for the founding 
principles of the NHS. The paper examines opposition to these policies, focussing 
on the mobilisation of resistance to the most recent development, namely the 
passing of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act under the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government. 
The article will focus primarily on policy after the election of the Labour 
government in 1997 although some brief discussion of earlier developments will be 
necessary on occasion for context. As health has been a devolved policy since 
2000, the developments described in this paper concern the English NHS only. 
First, the article will examine the marketisation and privatisation of the 
procurement policy for new large scale infrastructure projects, specifically the 
Private Finance Initiative in large hospital builds. The application of market 
processes to ancillary services and back-office functions will be discussed. The 
article then turns to the spreading out of market policies to embrace an ever 
widening range of clinical services. The extent of privatisation and some of the 
consequences for staff will be discussed. The paper provides an overview of the 
popular resistance to the most recent market restructuring and concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of these reforms for the founding principles and 
sustainability of the NHS.  Marketisation is understood as the (re)structuring of 
services so that ‘purchasing’ organisations are separated from ‘providing’ 
organisations with these relating to one another through contracts for which 
providers must compete; the financial system is redesigned so that ‘the money 
follows the patient’. Privatisation refers to the transfer, on a temporary or 
permanent basis, of activities, staff, assets, responsibilities, funding, regulation or 
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2. Capital investment and extending market forces in the procurement of new   
hospitals 
 
In 1994, a new approach to capital investment, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
was imposed as a requirement in NHS capital procurement processes, including for 
new hospital builds. Although initially a Conservative policy, it was the New 
Labour government elected in 1997 which championed it as the solution to finding 
finance for capital investment. PFI was described as a mechanism for levering 
private finance into public infrastructure development (Department of Health 
(DoH), 1997).  
Under PFI, as part of the process of procurement, decisions about whether or 
not to build a new hospital are taken by individual NHS Trusts2 which are looking 
to improve their own estate although in practice they need to be supported by local 
commissioning bodies. The individual Trust invites private sector consortia to bid 
to supply the new hospital. The NHS Trust enters into detailed negotiations with 
the preferred bidder. The consortium undertakes to design the hospital according to 
the output specification of the NHS Trust, to borrow finance to invest in its 
construction and to construct the hospital. The hospital once built is made available 
for use by the NHS Trust but the consortium of companies, or ‘special purpose 
vehicle’ (SPV - a specially created shell company) owns the hospital in that it has a 
right to the financial flows arising from it. This means that the NHS Trust must 
make payments to the SPV each year for the duration of the contract (typically 
around 30 years).3 Part of these payments is for the availability of the hospital and 
part is for the associated services such as maintenance, catering, help-desk support, 
cleaning, estates management or other facilities management services which form 
part of the contract. While the ownership and provision of these services are in 
private hands, the hospital Trust itself remains publicly managed and clinical 
services remain public.4 
The attractiveness of PFI lay in the fact that capital investment under PFI does 
not immediately affect the most widely used measures of capital spending, net 
borrowing and the stock of national debt, despite the fact that PFI debts are owed 
by public sector bodies and underwritten by the state (Hellowell, 2014). This 
allowed the impression of greater fiscal prudence to be conveyed than was actually 
the case and so had political benefits. By 2014, there were 123 operational PFI 
projects with a capital value of around £12.1bn) and many run-down hospitals had 
been replaced (HM Treasury, 2014). 
However, PFI entails much higher costs to the public sector for capital 
investment than was previously the case. These arise from the various factors 
including the higher cost of private borrowing, high levels of development costs 
(e.g. legal and financial advice) and the difficulties of predicting accurately at the 
_____________ 
 
2  Legal entities providing, typically hospital, mental health and/or community services. 
3  At the end of the contract period the hospital may or may not belong to the NHS Trust involved. 
4  Historically, decisions about new hospital construction were taken as part of the planning process at regional level. 
Money would be made available to the region through the Health Department and if necessary the Treasury would 
borrow this money. The new hospital would be designed by experts within the NHS and its building would be 
contracted to a private construction company which would be paid upon completion of the building work. The new 
hospital would belong to the NHS and would be managed and maintained by NHS staff. 
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time of negotiation what the contract needs to cover throughout its duration 
resulting in costly modifications to the contract in later years (e.g. see Ruane, 
2010a). Thus although the capital value of the 123 schemes mentioned above stood 
at £12.1bn, total repayments by the time they are made will amount to around 
£80bn according to official figures (HM Treasury, 2014). Because PFI repayments 
are underwritten in law, NHS Trusts must prioritise their PFI repayments above 
other demands on their revenue. As the capital element of the tariffs paid to 
hospitals for their clinical work does not reflect the full cost of PFI payments, there 
is evidence that PFI payments are an important part of budgetary pressures and 
NHS Trusts with large PFI schemes have become more vulnerable than others to 
falling into deficit (Pollock et al, 2011; Plimmer, 2014).   
An example is the 600-bed Peterborough and Stamford Hospitals NHS Trust. 
The Trust began repayments on its PFI contract following the £335m construction 
of a new hospital and two new health centres in 2010. Payments amounted to 
around £45m per annum but the hospital faced a projected deficit of £50m each 
year on little more than £200m revenue and the economic regulator concluded in 
June 2013 that the Trust, although it worked well ‘clinically’, was financially 
unsustainable (BBC News, 2013; Edwards, 2013). Rising with inflation, payments 
could potentially reach a total of almost £2bn by the end of the 35 year contract.  
PFI has also been held responsible for bed shortages in some Trusts (BBC 
News, 2000; Pollock and Price, 2013)5 and has distorted planning priorities by 
requiring patient care in the local system to be channelled to the PFI trust to ensure 
revenue is generated to make repayments. It stands in contradiction to other 
policies aimed at securing efficiencies and transferring a greater proportion of care 
out of hospitals and into community settings. It has removed hospitals from public 
ownership and to some extent concealed their ownership since the selling on of 
shares is difficult to track. Moreover their ownership is sometimes held by offshore 
companies which are structured to reduce their tax liabilities (Armitage and 
Holmes, 2014). It distracts managers from patient care and reduces the flexibility 
with which managers can direct aspects of the service where staff have been 
transferred (Ruane 2002).  
PFI was revised under the Coalition government and PF2 has taken its place. 
This new version of PFI alters the types of investors providing the capital and 
changes the ratio of debt (in the form of bank loans or bond finance) to risk capital 
(or equity) (HM Treasury, 2012). However, although it has been presented by the 
Treasury as reducing the risk of schemes, financial analysis has indicated that it is 
likely to push up the cost of capital further and consequently the Trust repayments, 








5  A disproportionately high number of proposed closures in Accident and Emergency departments are 
accounted for by NHS Trusts with significant PFI schemes (The Telegraph, 2011). 
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3. The marketisation of non-clinical services  
 
The first concerted application of market forces to staff within the NHS began in 
1983 under Margaret Thatcher’s administration when hospital managers were 
required to embark upon ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ to procure cleaning, 
catering and laundry services. The policy, along with its successor in the 1990s, 
‘market testing’, was effective in reducing the direct costs of providing these 
services (Cm 2212, 1993), largely because private contractors offered workers 
poorer conditions of employment (HM Treasury, 1986). As these are labour 
intensive services, it had the effect of reducing the numbers of staff employed, 
increasing the workload on those remaining and consequently reducing the quality 
of work done. Around 108,000 jobs in cleaning, catering and laundry were lost 
between 1983 and 1992 (Kerr and Radford, 1994; Joint NHS Privatisation 
Research Unit, 1990). 
In a context of funding constraints and efficiency initiatives and in which it was 
necessary to demonstrate that maximum value was being achieved, the momentum 
to ‘market test’ was sustained after New Labour’s election. Ongoing pressure on 
the cost of these services held staffing numbers, wages and terms and conditions 
down and this was the case regardless of whether staff were transferred to a private 
company or remained as part of the ‘in-house’ bid.  
The Private Finance Initiative created an additional policy context in which staff 
conditions were squeezed as an increasing range of non-clinical and ancillary 
services were seen by both private sector consortia and NHS Trust management as 
an aspect of PFI schemes where savings could be made (Ruane, 2002), facilitated 
by the prior weakening of trade union branches following fifteen years of 
competitive tendering. Under PFI, ancillary staff transferred to private sector 
companies at least until the 2002 Retention of Employment (RoE) deal created a 
way of keeping most ancillary staff in cleaning, catering, laundry, porterage and 
security services in the public sector although under this model they are managed 
by the private sector.6 One analysis calculated in 2012 that around 29% of hospital 
facilities management was outsourced (CBI and Oxford Economics, 2012). 
Over time, the range of services subjected to contracting-out processes, joint 
ventures or sell-offs expanded to include reception work, logistics and 
transportation of supplies, various back-office functions such as payroll and a 
number of semi-clinical services such as medical secretarial work, pathology 
laboratory and blood supply services.7 A recent example which reflects the drive to 
cut costs and the zealous extension of market competition is the contracting-out of 
general practice8 support services (including managing the transfer of patient 
records, administering payments to primary care suppliers and other back-office 
functions). Hoped-for cuts to the costs of these services were so deep (£40m from a 
_____________ 
 
6  The RoE Model does not, however, safeguard NHS status for workers in IT, payroll, medical and patient 
records, central sterile supply service departments or switchboard and reception services where these face 
transfer under PFI (UNSON, 2014). 
7  We should also mention briefly that by the mid-1990s a number of NHS functions had been sold off on a 
permanent basis including information systems and estates management which might be established as 
independent commercial businesses or sold off to existing enterprises. 
8  General practitioners (GPs) are generalist family doctors providing family care through general practices or 
health centres. 
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£100m annual budget) that no public sector option was considered feasible 
(Williams, 2014a). With variation by area, some of these functions had already 
been contracted out to diverse organisations. However, as primary care services 
were now commissioned by NHS England, a national body, the mechanism existed 
to re-engineer them so that they could be configured – and thus contracted - on a 
national, regional or multi-regional basis. This allowed for a single, large, multi-
year contract to be offered to provide these support services across England, a scale 
of contract considered more attractive than smaller scale opportunities by many 
private companies (Krachler and Greer 2015).  
 
 
4. The marketisation of clinical services 
 
A decisive shift in the delivery of health services occurred in the creation of market 
systems from the early 1990s. It is possible to construe the marketisation of clinical 
services in the NHS as taking place in three stages and this is used to organise the 
discussion here with greatest focus on the policies after 1997.9 
 
4.1. The creation of an internal market 1991-1997 
 
Until the early 1990s, the NHS was an integrated service in the sense that hospitals 
were run by health authorities within an hierarchical framework (national – 
regional – local – hospital) and were funded for their work not in a way relating 
directly to specified output but through a total sum of money, calculated annually 
through an incremental modification to the previous year’s budget and passed 
down from the national level to the local level, to cover all activity.  Under 
Conservative government reforms, hospitals were to be ‘liberated’ from their 
position in the hierarchy and were to lose the automatic allocation of cash for their 
overall activity. So-called purchasing organisations (purchasers) were to be 
separated from so-called providing organisations (providers). The new purchasers, 
District Health Authorities (DHAs) and GP Fundholders, would assess health need 
and contract with providers (e.g. hospitals and community units) for interventions 
and procedures to meet those needs. Hospitals would no longer be directly 
managed by DHAs but, as providers, would become self-governing NHS Trusts 
with greater freedoms to make their own decisions. Instead of receiving an annual 
financial allocation, they were to compete with each other, largely on the basis of 
price, for contracts from DHAs to provide health services (Cm 555, 1989; DoH, 
1989). 
 
4.2. Re-creating the market 2000-2010  
 
In the run-up to the 1997 General Election, the Labour Party promised to abolish 
the internal market. It abolished GP fundholding in 1999 and moved away from 
competition. However, it retained the independent status of NHS Trusts and the 
_____________ 
 
9  It should be noted there were modifications to the market and the intensity with which market forces were 
executed within each of these ‘stages’. 
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purchaser-provider split. From the early 2000s Labour began to create the 
institutional structures of a competitive market. Purchasing was renamed 
‘commissioning’ and was undertaken by local bodies covering a geographically 
defined area, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). A new financial system was 
implemented in the NHS in 2004 which allowed payment for each specific 
procedure to flow to the provider of the procedure. At the same time, some limited 
patient choice pilots were introduced in London and, from 2006 onwards, all 
patients were able, at the point of referral for elective care, to choose from at least 
four providers and from 2008 from a list of nationally approved providers (Dixon 
et al, 2010). This list included NHS Trusts, numerous independent sector (i.e. for 
profit and not-for-profit) organisations and Labour’s newly created ‘NHS 
Foundation Trusts’, apparently modelled on a Spanish forerunner, which had 
additional freedoms with regard to the services they provided and the financial and 
business undertakings they could enter into. This was effectively an ‘any qualified 
provider’ (AQP) policy, that is to say a model of competition whereby, from a 
register of approved providers, patients rather than commissioners chose the 
provider of the service.10 
New Labour had actively to create a market in secondary care (Appleby, 2006; 
Leys and Player, 2011). As well as a contracting infrastructure, Labour’s market-
making included the creation of competitors. Foundation Trusts differed from NHS 
Trusts in several respects. Rather than being ’owned’ by the Department of Health, 
they report to an independent regulator and are accountable to a local governing 
body elected by ‘members’ (local residents, patients, staff and other local 
stakeholders). They enjoy freedom from ministerial directives as well as substantial 
financial freedoms in relation to sales of assets, borrowing, investment, retention of 
surpluses and ways of incentivising staff  (Baggott, 2007). 
More radically, the Department of Health announced the establishment of 
independent sector ‘Treatment Centres’ (ISTCs) ostensibly to add to the capacity 
of the NHS (Cm 5503, 2002). These Treatment Centres offered fast track surgery 
in routine cases, along with some diagnostic services. Routine ophthalmology and 
orthopaedic surgery and cataract removals featured prominently but not exclusively 
in the services they provided (Player and Leys, 2008:8). In the event, the private 
companies which got these contracts were all based overseas and were trumpeted 
by the Secretary of State as offering capacity which was additional to that offered 
by the NHS. However, two factors give cause to question this assertion. The first is 
that these ISTCs were established in parts of the country where there were no 
waiting list problems which meant they created a competitive rather than 
supplementary presence (Health Select Committee (HSC), 2006). The second is 
that assurances initially given that the ISTCs would have to hire their own staff 
rather than pull staff out of the NHS were subsequently superseded by a policy 
which permitted the secondment of NHS staff (Player and Leys, 2008). The value 
for money assertions of the Department of Health could not be verified since the 
DoH refused to put the relevant figures into the public domain (HSC), 2006). 
While all NHS providers were subjected to uniform tariffs for procedures, ISTCs 
_____________ 
 
10 Another model of competition, where the commissioner contracts out the provision of a service to an 
organisation on the basis of competitive bids for the contract, ran alongside this and was used in other aspects 
of health care. 
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were paid above this level and while NHS providers were paid only for the 
procedures they conducted, the first wave of ISTCs were guaranteed payment for a 
fixed number of procedures regardless of whether or not they actually performed 
them (Moore, 2008). In addition, the DoH guaranteed to buy back some of the 
Treatment Centres, removing or substantially reducing the risk to the private sector 
entailed in investing in the new facilities (Gainsbury, 2008). Overall, around 
£500m was given in public subsidies to these early ISTCs (Fotaki et al, 2013). 
New Labour’s market also required the construction of a patient population 
which was interested in choice or, more precisely, in a specific type of choice. This 
was essentially a market conception of choice (Fotaki, 2014): not the choice to 
discuss more fully different treatment options with an expert or to be assured of 
high quality care in local NHS institutions but a version of choice in which the 
consumer chooses from a number of suppliers. Patient choice had not historically 
been a dominant feature of the British NHS. Instead patients traded choice for free 
access to the treatment they needed from the local ‘branch’ of a cost-efficient and 
highly trusted National Health Service. A key founding principle of the NHS was 
that health care was allocated according to need and need alone. Research 
suggested patients held mixed views on the importance of choice to say the least 
(e.g. Fotaki et al, 2006) and ministers had to persuade NHS patients of the virtues 
of consumerism, for instance by disparaging the service as ‘top-down’, ‘monolithic 
and ‘one-size-fits-all’, stifling diversity and choice (Milburn, 2001).  
The assault on the cultural meanings given to health care was necessary to 
create a market in which people actually exercised a choice. However, the 
emphasis on choice also served as the surface construction of policy which covered 
over the underbelly of market competition, privatisation and profit making (or 
surplus extracting). Ministerial speeches couched developments not in terms of 
market efficiency but as ‘modernisation’ giving people a more personalised and 
convenient service and the choice they already expected in other areas of their lives 
(e.g. Milburn, 2003). Fixed tariffs per procedure (ITSCs notwithstanding) moved 
the system away from price competition. Instead, providers were expected to 
compete on efficiency and ‘quality’ and a selective amount of information began to 
be made publicly available relating to the performance of different Trusts and 
different surgeons (Lewis and Dixon, 2005).  
Labour also applied market principles to primary care. A new GP contract in 
2004 allowed PCTs to contract out GP services to ‘Alternative Providers’. In 
ostensibly ‘under-doctored areas’, GP surgeries could be contracted out to private 
companies.11 Across England, scores of contracts were let to alternative providers 
of primary care services under the Equitable Access Programme of 2007 (Roberts, 
2014a). A move to reconfigure services by altering the boundary between hospital-
based and community-based care through the creation of polyclinics or health 
centres also entailed competitive contracting out processes with a range of different 
organisations, including those in the non-profit and commercial sectors, awarded 
contracts (Kay, 2008). 
_____________ 
 
11  National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) Regulations 2004 
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The 2004 GP contract also permitted GPs, for the first time since the creation of 
the NHS, to drop the provision of services on a 24/7 basis. Ninety per cent of GP 
practices immediately abandoned responsibility for the provision of out-of-hours 
care, a responsibility they had found increasingly intolerable and burdensome 
(NAO, 2006; HSC, 2010a) and this figure has not substantially altered since (NAO, 
2014). Primary Care Trusts faced the task of finding alternative providers of 
evening, overnight, weekend and statutory holiday primary care. This effectively 
led to the creation of a de facto market in these services. Some out-of-hours 
services were provided by groups of NHS GPs either as private companies or on a 
cooperative or social enterprise basis. Other providers were large commercial 
organisations such as Serco and Harmoni with a track record of contracting 
services from public agencies. This new market marked a shift towards the 
provision of medical care by overseas doctors employed on a locum basis by 
commercial providers (HSC, 2010a) and contributed further to a process in which 
out-of-hours care was increasingly given by nurses rather than GPs (NAO, 2006).  
Labour planned also to apply market processes to community services such as 
health visiting, care for people with learning disabilities, district nursing and 
various types of therapeutic services (Cm 7432, 2008). Employed by the PCTs, 
these staff were initially at the heart of the organisation, then located in a provider 
‘wing’ of the organisation, then at arms-length from the organisation and were then 
destined to be spun out as independent provider organisations in a new community 
services market. The anticipation of the 2010 General Election interrupted this 
process and under the Coalition government these services transferred in the first 
instance to one of the providing institutions of the NHS. From here, however, they 
have become subject to competitive contracting processes and, as discussed below, 
some of the largest private sector contracts within the NHS are in this sector.12 
 
4.3. Restructuring the market 2010-present 
 
Despite a pre-election promise to the contrary, the Coalition government prioritised 
a major restructuring of the health service, so that market forces were applied to a 
much wider range of health care in a context of more aggressive competition rules. 
Some of the main existing structures of the NHS were abolished after a period of 
double-running in which the newly emergent organisations operated in shadow 
form alongside them. Thus, Strategic (regional) Health Authorities and Primary 
Care Trusts (local) were abolished. Public health was taken out of the NHS and 
transferred into local authorities where it sits alongside other determinants of health 
such as urban planning and transport (though in a context of severe cuts to local 
authority funding). 
The new principal commissioning bodies at a local level are 211 Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) which are GP-led organisations and hold, across 
England, approximately 65% of the NHS budget (NHS England, 2013). They 
replace 152 Primary Care Trusts. They are composed of GP practices, typically 
within a particular geographical area, and are responsible for arranging most health 
_____________ 
 
12  Although Labour’s market was primarily a ‘provider’ market, it should be noted that 14 organisations, 
including large US-based health insurance companies, were licensed in 2007 to ‘assist’ PCTs with 
commissioning. 
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care for the patients on the practice lists. They have some discretion as to which 
health services they wish to procure and they cover secondary care, mental health 
care and community-based services such as health visitors and therapists and 
ambulance services. They are required to engage in competitive processes in order 
to contract for health care except where a limited number of circumstances apply 
and they are prohibited in law from favouring one sector (e.g. the public sector) 
over another (e.g. the commercial sector).13 To strengthen CCGs in their 
commissioning role, commissioning support units offer a range of needs 
assessment and commercial services which can be bought in by the CCGs. 
Specialist services are commissioned by the local offices of a new quango called 
NHS England and primary care services by NHS England jointly with CCGs. 
On the providing side of the market, any organisation can compete to provide 
health care and any organisation can apply to be licensed to offer services under the 
AQP provision. Thus, in theory in this revitalised market, small local charities and 
voluntary groups, large third sector not-for-profit organisations, social enterprises, 
small businesses, transnational corporations and public sector (NHS) organisations 
can all vie for business. They have the right to mount a legal challenge if they 
believe a commissioning organisation has not applied the rules of competition 
fairly. All NHS trusts are expected to become NHS Foundation Trusts with added 
freedoms regarding the services they provide and the financial undertakings they 
are able to enter into. NHS Foundation Trusts are also able to earn up to 49% of 
their revenue through private medicine and no longer need to focus primarily on 
NHS-funded patients. The longer-term expectation is that all NHS providers 
eventually become ‘social enterprises’ or ‘mutuals’ outside the public sector and 
some NHS trusts already have a ‘mutual pathfinder’ status. 
The rules of competition are the responsibility of an ‘economic regulator’ 
which, under the auspices of the Competition and Markets Authority, defines the 
rules and enforces them, dispensing penalties for anti-competitive practices. It also 
plays a decisive role in acquisitions and mergers. The rules of competition are 
provided for in the ‘Section 75 regulations’. These require CCGs to engage in 
competitive processes in the contracting of heath care services in most instances. If 
NHS England or a CCG is accused of breaching the regulations (as has already 
occurred), it is the economic regulator’s role to investigate the breach. There is a 
quality regulator which faces the daunting task of monitoring and inspecting all 
health and social care providers throughout England. Organisations seeking to 
provide services under AQP must be licensed by both the economic and quality 
regulators. 
Potentially the most far-reaching element of the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act, and the most symbolic, concerned the repeal of the legal duty of the Secretary 
of State to provide national health services in England - a duty which had existed 





13  Some community services, at present a minority, are arranged through the Any Qualified Provider (AQP) 
process whereby registered organisations compete with each other to attract patients and CCGs pay those 
organisations according to the choices of patients for those specific providers. Other services are contracted 
out on a competitive bidding process. 
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5. Growing privatisation in clinical services 
 
5.1. Hospital services 
 
Although health authorities had been able to purchase services from private 
hospitals since 1981, the Conservative internal market of the 1990s did not greatly 
involve the private sector outside initiatives to reduce waiting lists (Givan and 
Bach, 2007). The internal market was overwhelmingly a system of contractual 
relationships and processes among public sector (NHS) organisations. The pathway 
to privatising clinical services was only really embarked upon within the context of 
New Labour’s developing market structure. The NHS Plan of 2000 announced that 
the NHS would purchase health services from the private sector where it was 
advantageous and pragmatic to do so (Cm 4818, 2000). This was seen as a major 
watershed in the evolution of Labour’s policy stance given its historic antagonism 
to the private health care sector. Labour’s market structure enabled a diversity of 
organisations including commercial organisations to articulate with the NHS 
through the mechanism of the contract,14 particularly via the Extended Choice 
Network and Free Choice Network in the sphere of diagnostics and elective 
surgery, two fields of activity in which profit could be predictably made with 
limited risk. Inpatient mental health services have made significant use of 
independent sector providers for some years, reflecting a shortage of NHS 
capacity. 
 
5.2. Community services 
 
As mentioned above and originating under New Labour provisions, community 
based services such as therapists and health visitors as well as community hospital 
provision have been subjected to competitive market processes and this has 
resulted in some large scale transfers of provision to the private sector. An 
examples id the £0.5bn contract awarded to Virgin Care in 2012 to provide all 
community services in North West and South West Surrey for a five year period 
and 2,500 staff transferred to the new employer. This included services in seven 
community hospitals, district nursing, health visiting, breast screening, wheelchair 
services, physiotherapy, prison health care and sexual health services (Adams, 
2012).15 The new provider of these services retains the name of the previous 
provider, Surrey Community Health, arguably reducing the public visibility of the 
fact that these services have been transferred to a large private corporation.  
_____________ 
 
14  It appears that the legislative basis for enabling transnational corporations and other profit making providers to 
be woven into a largely socialised health service as mainstream providers is an overlooked phrase in an 
obscure paragraph in the 2003 Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act (Section 175, 
para (2), subsection (b)) (Price, 2007). 
15  At the time of writing, the Virgin Care website claimed the company provides 230 NHS and social care 
services across England, including primary care services (GP practices, urgent care centres, minor injury 
units, walk-in centres and prison care); intermediate care services (such as audiology, dermatology, 
ophthalmology, rheumatology, back and joint pain, ENT, ultrasound); and community services (such as those 
mentioned above plus neuro-rehabilitation, frail/elderly care, services for children with complex mental, 
physical and sensory learning difficulties and end of life care) (Virgin Care 
http://www.virgincare.co.uk/about-us/) 
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5.3. Out-of-hours primary care 
 
NHS England does not collect data in relation to which organisations provide out-
of-hours care. The National Audit Office reported, on the basis of 175 survey 
responses from a total of 211 CCGs, that commercial organisations held 31% of 
out-of-hours contracts in 2014 (with social enterprises, often former GP 
cooperatives, holding 49% and NHS bodies holding 20% of contracts) (NAO, 
2014). This represents an increase on 2012 when an estimated one quarter of the 
English population was covered by a private out-of-hours provider (Primary Care 
Foundation, 2012). A 2015 analysis of patient survey data from 80,000 patients 
with recent experience of out-of-hours care found that on average commercial 
providers scored lowest on patient experience of care (Warren et al, 2015). An 
earlier assessment of private providers of out-of-hours care concluded that the 
service they provided was poorer than that of not-for-profit cooperatives run by 
GPs and NHS providers but was also more expensive than the not-for-profit 
cooperatives (Primary Care Foundation, 2012). The numbers of patients receiving 
care from out-of-hours providers has dropped markedly with 5.8m patients 
receiving such care in 2013/14 against 8.6m in 2007/8 (NAO, 2014). This decline 
has been attributed (NAO, 2014) to the triage system operated by another part of 
the urgent care system, the telephone helpline NHS 111, run through over 40 
different contracts across England, a small number of which are for-profit contracts 
(Rimmer, 2012). 
This has been an area of care dogged by scandal and criticism. Take Care Now, 
a company contracted by Cambridge Primary Care Trust to provide out of hours 
care, employed a German doctor who, on his first shift, killed a patient through the 
administration of an excessive dose of a drug with which he was not familiar. The 
investigation by the Care Quality Commission revealed numerous clinical and 
procedural weaknesses in the company (CQC, 2010) which was reported to be 
focussed primarily on cutting costs and expanding business rather than on the 
quality of patient care (Smith, 2010). Although the Primary Care Foundation 
(2012) reported overall improvement in out-of-hours services there have been 
numerous reports of dangerously low staffing levels in private providers. For 
example, just one doctor was reportedly available to 535,000 patients on some 
nights in Cornwall (Borland, 2012) in a service run by Serco which was also 
criticised for altering its reported performance data (PAC, 2013).  
 
5.4. Expenditure on private provision 
 
Calculating the extent of privatisation is complex. In an analysis of figures which 
pre-date the Coalition reforms, the Nuffield Trust reported that NHS spending on 
non NHS providers in 2011/12 was £8.67 billion (Arora et al, 2013) and £8.45bn of 
this was spent by Primary Care Trusts. Most of this (£5.22bn) was spent on private 
secondary care providers and accounts for most of the increase in spending on non-
NHS providers in the previous five years, with £0.59bn spent on voluntary sector 
providers. The £8.67bn figure also appears to include £400m spent on out-of-hours 
providers (see Jones and Charlesworth, 2013:14 and HSCIC, 2012a) and £2.53bn 
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on services obtained via local authorities (Arora et al 2013). It excludes, however, 
spending on the vast majority of primary care (including prescribing costs) which 
is provided by GPs, dentists, opticians and pharmacists who are largely private 
contractors to the NHS or by the relatively new ‘alternative’ providers. This 
spending amounted to £21.6bn or 24% of PCT spending on NHS care (Jones and 
Charlesworth, 2013:14). These figures indicate that a little under a third of PCT 
spending (£91bn in total) goes to the private provision of clinical services. In 
addition to this, Trust providers spent a further £628.7m on PFI debt interest 
payments (which are increasing by about 18% each year) and £11.2bn on supplies 
and services (including drugs). These figures amount to around £42bn out of a total 
PCT spending on health in England of £91bn.16   
It should be underscored that most of the spending on privately provided 
services and supplies (notably primary care, pharmaceuticals, supplies) is not new 
and does not result from marketisation since the 1990s. The new area of activity 
concerns spending on secondary care and community service provision. This is 
increasing rapidly (from £2.09bn in 2006/7 to £5.22bn in 2011/12 (Arora et al, 
2013:14) but is still a small proportion of the overall NHS budget and is actually 
cited by the Department of Health as evidence that the NHS is not being privatised 
(Campbell, 2015).  
A Freedom of Information request submitted by the British Medical Journal 
revealed that 33% of 3,492 contracts awarded by 182 CCGs between April 2013 
and August 2014 had been awarded to the private sector. A further 10% had been 
awarded to voluntary and social enterprise providers and 2% to other providers 
such as joint ventures or local authorities (National Health Executive, 2014).17 The 
total value of all the contracts investigated was £10bn. Around £8.5bn worth of 
contracts went to NHS providers, £690m to voluntary and social enterprise 
providers and £490m to the private sector - 5% of the total. Private sector providers 
were most successful at winning contracts awarded via competitive tender - 80 
compared with 59 won by NHS providers. Private firms were also more likely to 
win smaller contracts on an Any Qualified Provider basis, for services such as 
diagnostics, audiology, and podiatry in the community. A Centre for Health and the 
Public Interest investigation estimated that the NHS holds around 53,000 contracts 
with non-NHS providers, 15,000 of which are held by CCGs (CHPI, 2015).18 
The challenges facing the private sector companies wishing to enter or expand 
in the NHS market remain considerable with uncertainties arising from periodic 
reorganisations and policy changes, commissioning practices, the scale of 
contracts, austerity funding and the competitiveness of NHS providers (on both 
cost and quality) frustrating the advance of privatisation (Krachler and Greer, 
2015). Nonetheless, both the number of contracts awarded to private companies 
_____________ 
 
16  Total departmental spending was £105.4bn in 2011/12 (Jones and Charlesworth, 2013). 6.1% of the NHS 
budget in 2013/14 was spent on commissioning private providers (Roberts, 2014b). 
17  These included different types of contract to provide NHS clinical services, including those awarded to a 
single provider without the competitive procurement process of an open tender, those awarded via a 
competitive tendering process, and those awarded to multiple providers under Any Qualified Provider. 
18  Most of these 53,000 contracts are with commercial providers but the exact proportion is not known (CHPI, 
2015). 
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and the amount spent on private provision are rising and one estimate suggests 
spending on non NHS provision is rising twice as fast as the total budget (TUC, 2015). 
 
5.5. Policy making 
 
The advance of privatisation concerns not only the provision of services but also 
the process of policy-making. Throughout the past 15 years, private sector 
personnel have been appointed to positions in which they can facilitate or 
implement privatisation ‘from the inside’. This can be seen in Labour’s 
Partnerships UK, launched in 2000 and designed to capture and entrench expertise 
from the private financial sector to drive through the implementation of PFI, a 
notoriously complex policy (Ruane, 2010b). It can be seen in the 2003 
establishment of the Commercial Directorate, staffed with individuals effectively 
on secondment to the Department of Health from private sector at a cost, per 
individual, of £1,000 - £2,000 each per day, to facilitate market creation and the 
process of bringing private sector providers into the NHS (Leys and Player, 
2011:15). It can also be seen in some of the key institutions of the new post-2012 
NHS market. NHS England which is mandated to run the NHS on behalf of the 
Secretary of State is headed by Simon Stevens who moved from his role as 
Executive Vice President of United Health Group to take the post. The economic 
regulator Monitor has a chief executive (David Bennett) and a managing director 
(Adrian Masters) who are both former senior directors of McKinsey (Private Eye, 
2014). McKinsey is reported to have exercised considerable influence over sections 
of the 2011 Health and Social Care Bill and has been awarded a number of NHS 
contracts (Cave, 2011; Rose, 2012).19  
It has become increasingly evident that tracking the privatisation of services 
presents a major challenge to those who want to monitor this level of detail. There 
is no national database which conveys a picture of the current and changing state of 
affairs. The notion of ‘patchwork privatisation’ a term coined in a campaigners’ 
publication a decade ago (Nunns, 2006) remains apposite, with different services 
being contracted out to different providers at different speeds and on different 
scales in different parts of England.  
 
 
6. The impact of privatisation on staff  
 
It should be remembered that in many instances the use of competitive tendering 
and market testing did not result in privatisation. Instead, it might result in 
competitive bids being won by in-house teams (NAO, 1987; Givan and Bach, 
2007) whose wages and terms and conditions were depressed, following the 1983 
rescission of the Fair Wages Resolution of 1946 (Mohan, 1995). Most staff who 
have been affected directly are those outside clinical services, either NHS 
_____________ 
 
19  All three individuals were involved in advising on or implementing Labour’s market in the early 2000s with 
Stevens as health policy advisor to Tony Blair and David Bennett leading the No 10 Downing Street policy 
directorate and strategy unit, underscoring again the continuity of policy across different administrations. We 
also see here the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon whereby individuals pass back and forth across the state /  
private sector boundary altering the culture and functioning of state departments and regulatory bodies. 
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employees transferred to the private sector employers or new staff directly 
employed by the private contractor. As an example, the number of building 
services staff directly employed in the NHS declined almost 15% between 1995 
and 2005 at the same time as the number of professional staff in the NHS rose by 
33% (ICHSC, 2006). 
As contracting out or transfer under PFI almost always occurs in a context of 
financial constraint and as a cost saving stratagem, staff find themselves reduced in 
number relative to the amount of work which has to be done. Their ability to 
perform the work to the standards they would wish is threatened and their own 
situation is also made more precarious. Although their trade unions have invoked 
legal protections and attempted to negotiate protective arrangements for transferred 
workers (Kerr and Radford, 1994), these staff had often been poorly paid and 
relatively easy to replace even before transfer though, as NHS employees, they did 
benefit from nationally negotiated wage settlements. The so-called TUPE 
protections20 offered protection of terms and conditions and wages for transferring 
staff although it was possible for new employers to abandon these protections on 
economic, technical or organisational grounds. Additionally, transferred staff who 
subsequently change jobs or move to another private employer were likely to lose 
any protections they may have had including access to the NHS Pensions Scheme.  
The introduction of multiple employers into the provision of services on a 
single site reduced trust, compromised accountability, undermined teamwork and 
resulted in a ‘two-tier workforce’, that is to say, the working alongside each other 
of workers in similar jobs on different wages, terms and conditions (Givan and 
Bach, 2007; Ruane, 2007). Where previously the NHS offered all employees 
relatively good pensions, competitive wages and continuity of employment across 
skill levels, the use of competition and the resulting decentralisation and 
fragmentation of employment have led to variations in employment practices 
resulting in reduced terms and conditions and loss of job security with a 
disproportionately heavy burden being borne by women (Givan and Bach, 2007). 
Over time, inequalities among workers increased (Ruane, 2007).   
At the same time, some private employers improved their human resource 
practices as a result of their engagement with the public sector. Bach and Givan 
(2010) found that trade unions could, in some circumstances, exploit Labour’s 
avowed commitment that PFI would not be at the expense of workers’ conditions 
by demanding that the private employers treat staff reasonably. Effective 
campaigning by trade unions along with a recognition by government of the 
weaknesses of TUPE protections gave rise to a voluntary ‘Two-Tier Code’ in 2005 
which required most new staff within private or third sector contractors to be 
employed on terms broadly comparable with (“no less favourable than”) those of 
public sector workers covered by Agenda for Change, the national framework for 
wage structures in the NHS (Grimshaw et al, 2007). However, some considered 
that the ‘Two-Tier Code’ offered weak protection. It was abandoned by incoming 
coalition government in 2010 (Santry, 2010). 
_____________ 
 
20  This refers to referring to Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, replaced by 
Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2014 
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Even when the Code was in place the Retention of Employment Agreement in 
force, the fragmentation caused by multi-employer working brought a number of 
inherent problems. One case study investigation explored relationships and 
practices in a PFI hospital, in which rank and file ancillary workers remained 
within the NHS but their supervisors and managers transferred to the soft facilities 
private provider. The researchers found fragmentation of the workforce across 
multiple employers blurred employment relationships and created inconsistencies 
and inequities in the way in which agreed human resource procedures were 
interpreted and implemented by the different employers (Marchington et al, 2011). 
Staff attitudes towards collaboration at work are conditional upon arrangements 
being consistent with fair treatment yet different custom and practice across the 
private and public sectors in the treatment of staff, especially approaches to 
performance management, contributed to perceived inequities. Opportunities for 
skills and career development which looked theoretically possible, were sometimes 
not realised in practice because of the reluctance of NHS staff to apply for 
promotions that would entail transferring to the private company with the 
associated uncertainty and loss of NHS pension. Developing identity and a 
commitment to the partnership were made more problematic by the high 
management turnover in the private company and by the stark contrast between the 
goals of the organisations with NHS staff perceived to be reluctant to sign up to the 
profit goals of the private sector. The researchers conclude that the challenges for 
human resource management in the management of cross-organisational working 
go beyond questions of culture and attitudes to problems inherent in managing 
employment where there is more than one employing organisation exercising 
influence (Grimshaw et al, 2010) 
There is no obligation upon employers to recognise trade unions outside general 
employment law and recognition needs to be sought on an employer by employer 
basis (Unite, 2013). The sheer multiplicity of providers leads to both fragmentation 
of services and fragmentation of bargaining and undermines the sustainability of a 
national agreement on wages, term and conditions. While there has been only 
limited movement towards local bargaining on terms and conditions in NHS 
organisations even among Foundation Trusts which in principle can opt out, 
fragmentation of provision poses resource-intensive challenges for Trade Unions of 
recruiting new members, securing recognition and entering into bargaining across 
multiple sites many of which are less procedurally orientated than is the case in 
public sector industrial relations (Bach, 2011). The shift towards market systems 
leads to the reliance of NHS organisations on revenue generated from successful 
competition for contracts rather than the previous more predictable planned 
allocation of funding and vulnerability to decisions of the economic regulator 
regarding the level of tariffs which are increasingly squeezed in times of financial 
constraint. These factors increasingly set the key parameters shaping what can be 
achieved through bargaining or, more precisely, through the arm’s-length 
bargaining mediated by the pay review bodies (Bach 2011). 
In 2013, the NHS Pensions Scheme was opened up to employees who are 
compulsorily transferred to private providers although continued access to the 
Scheme is dependent upon the private employer meeting certain requirements. This 
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benefitted employees but simultaneously removed one of the most substantial 
political and economic obstacles to privatisation. 
 
 
7. Some of the consequences of choosing the market 
 
Although short-lived, the 1990s internal market enabled the Conservatives to 
establish the principle of the purchaser-provider split. Despite numerous 
subsequent reorganisations of the NHS, the enduring consequences of this decisive 
organisational shift are evident. After 1997, New Labour abolished GP fundholding 
but did not abandon the purchaser-provider split. It never reintegrated NHS trusts, 
and their management within a hierarchical framework was never restored. The 
establishment and retention of the purchaser-provider split, which has endured to 
this day, creates the skeletal framework for a market system which both New 
Labour and the Coalition government have elaborated. Thus not only was the 
principle of the purchaser-provider split embedded but with it the possibility of a 
market and through this it became possible to establish a health system which 
combined public funding with part-privatised provision. In the years following 
1997, New Labour could have moved in another direction, away from the market. 
However, the marketisers, within the parliamentary party or advising ministers, 
prevailed. So, in the early to mid-2000s, New Labour confirmed the entrenchment 
of the market principle in health care, with the accompanying elements of 
contracting and competition, fatally damaging its ability to contest the Coalition 
government’s legislative proposals after 2010 which ushered in a more far-reaching 
and all-encompassing market with legal protections for private providers 
The restructuring of the NHS as a market established processes and structures 
which required new types of data and new skill-sets. The market required that 
organisations draw up contracts and in order to do so they had to know how much 
their services cost and what to charge for them.21 Discovering how much services 
cost required measuring various inputs which in turn required increasingly complex 
information and data management systems. Thus the creation of the market brought 
about a burgeoning in the resources required not only to run the market and 
manage it but also to address and solve a range of problems arising from it. In this 
way, the establishment of the market, competition and contracting provoked the 
emergence of a new set of system gaps or weaknesses: for instance, system 
weaknesses in contracting, measurement, data handling and data sharing.  
The result was unsurprisingly a large expansion in the numbers of people 
employed in the NHS in administrative and management rather than clinical or 
caring roles. While the number of full time equivalent staff in Community and 
Hospital Health Services increased by 3% between 1999 and 2009, the full time 
equivalent number of staff in management and senior management roles increased 
by 6.2% and those in ‘central functions’ increased by 4.9% (HSCIC, 2012b). These 
figures do not tell us precisely how many staff were working in roles associated 
_____________ 
 
21  Even under New Labour’s market, where the price for procedures was fixed and competition was ostensibly 
on the grounds of efficiency and quality, the Department of Health had to collect information annually from 
NHS providers to discover what the costs of producing services were in order to arrive at a national ‘average’ 
which was used to fix the next year’s tariffs. 
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exclusively with market-related functions (i.e. whose jobs would not have existed 
but for the market) but they do suggest that, as the NHS was restructured and 
reorganised on market lines, it required a disproportionately higher number of staff 
undertaking management functions.  
As all of this indicates, the cost of running the health system has increased 
substantially over the period. The Health Select Committee reported in 2010 that 
the administrative costs of the NHS, based on unpublished research using 2003 
data, amounted to 14% of the budget annually (Bloor et al, 2005; HSC, 2010b). 
This is a significant increase on 5-6% in the 1970s (Webster 1996) and before the 
subsequent roll-out of Labour’s market. Calum Paton (2014) has estimated 
conservatively that the annual recurrent cost of the market aspect of the service is 
around £4.5bn. (He has also estimated that the cost of setting up the markets under 
New Labour and the Coalition government was £3bn each.) 
The 1990s hospital trusts had considerable discretion regarding the terms and 
conditions upon which they employed staff although in practice most did not move 
away from nationally bargained conditions of work. They did however use their 
greater autonomy to alter or ‘re-engineer’ elements of the labour process, including 
work organisation, skill mix, working time arrangements and the use of temporary 
contracts, altering the composition of the workforce as they did so (Grimshaw, 
1999). Where previously staff had enjoyed relatively good conditions of work and 
continuity of employment, the creation of self-governing trusts in the 1990s saw 
the beginning of a process by which these have been eroded. Certainly, 
employment practices have had a ‘harder’ edge to them since then.  
 
 
8. Popular resistance to marketisation and privatisation 
 
One of the consequences of marketization and growing privatisation was the 
emergence of groups of citizens organising to resist further developments. This 
resistance was at its strongest and most coherent during the campaign to oppose the 
2011 Health and Social Care Bill. This case study also demonstrates the resolute 
determination of government to persist with its marketisation programme 
regardless of the scale of opposition. 
Popular resistance to the Coalition government’s legislative proposals was 
organised in a networked and horizontal fashion typical of protest movements in 
the digital era (Castells, 2012; Mason, 2012; Scambler et al, 2014). Although 
somewhat patchy and often lacking in strong coordination and clarity of strategy, 
the relationships among campaigning organisations and campaigners were 
extensive enough to constitute a loosely connected opposition movement.  
Outside the labour movement and professional organisations, several different 
hubs of activity contributed to lobbying, raising awareness and organising 
symbolic and other events. ‘UKUncut’ organised temporary occupations of banks 
(held responsible for the financial crash and austerity politics) or companies known 
to avoid taxes (held responsible for depriving public services of much-needed 
funding). ‘Occupy’ mounted a huge occupation of the courtyard in front of St 
Paul’s Cathedral over several months and branded a one-day occupation of the 
bridge across the Thames at the Palace of Westminster. ‘38 Degrees’, an 
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organisation linked to ‘members’ through an extensive e-list, emerged onto the 
activist scene and launched several innovative e-actions. ‘Keep Our NHS Public’ 
(KONP), a national umbrella campaign formed in 2005, brought expertise in 
relation to health policy per se to the resistance movement and comprised local 
groups and a national steering committee (itself arising from a partnerships of three 
pre-existing organisations plus senior members of the medical profession and 
academics) in a fairly loose network of collaboration and affiliation. By 2010, more 
than twenty local groups were affiliated to Keep Our NHS Public. A wider range of 
local, unaffiliated, anti-health service cuts groups also became active in the anti-
reform campaign. These groups varied significantly in size, composition and 
leadership. 
These organisations, along with individuals who did not readily belong to any 
of them, participated in an e-connected network, sometimes planning events and 
interventions together, sometimes supporting each other’s actions by sharing and 
disseminating information about them, sometimes operating independently. 
With regard to the 2011 Health and Social Care Bill, the overall aim of this 
opposition movement was essentially a defensive one: to maintain the status quo as 
a minimum and to halt the passage of the legislation. Strategically, campaigners 
sought to create a cleavage between the dominant Conservative Party and junior 
Liberal democrat Party in government; to forge an alliance with other opponents of 
the bill; to persuade the Labour Party to oppose the bill more vigorously; and to 
expose the dangers of the bill in order to widen public opposition and persuade 
wavering organisations to oppose. 
The most significant feature of the political context was the status of the 
government as a coalition, the first British peacetime coalition government since 
the 1930s. This created a built-in fault-line in government and there was some 
speculation as to the stability of the arrangement, the likelihood of an early general 
election and the pressure points which might bring about change in government 
policy. One strategy for many campaigners was to peel the Liberal Democrats 
away from the Conservatives on the question of health reform. The intra-party split 
in the Liberal Democrats between the more left-leaning ‘social liberals’ and the 
more right wing ‘orange book liberals’ offered the prospect of party indiscipline as 
grassroots party pressure could be anticipated – and provoked – on a leadership 
which had moved rightwards on health. The campaign seized this opportunity by 
mounting a sustained lobbying of Liberal Democrat MPs and peers. This was 
particularly marked at moments in the parliamentary or party decision-making 
processes and took the form of direct pressure through letter writing and indirect 
pressure through lobbying of grassroots Liberal Democrat members. Briefing 
papers were produced and template letters were devised at various stages of the 
campaign and disseminated to groups and individuals across the country to 
increase the amount of correspondence and the pressure on Liberal Democrat 
parliamentarians and cross-bench (i.e. non-aligned) peers. The most intense 
pressure was reserved for the Liberal Democrat conferences. A fringe event jointly 
organised by KONP and the disaffected social liberal group within the Liberal 
Democrats, had the effect of stalling but not halting the passage of the bill. Despite 
the huge effort expended on this kind of parliamentary engagement, all bar a tiny 
number of MPs and peers voted along party lines. 
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The creation of an alliance among opponents of the bill proved impossible. Both 
the parliamentary Labour Party and the Labour-affiliated trade unions retained a 
distance from the campaigning organisations, at least at a national level (locally 
there could be more collaboration). Labour’s strategy was largely a parliamentary 
one aiming, by means of reasoned argument, to persuade Liberal Democrat MPs to 
vote against the bill and the parliamentary Labour Party’s engagement with the 
public was weak (Ruane, 2012). Trade unions opposed the bill and produced useful 
briefing papers and campaign materials but their opposition had limited visibility to 
the public and they did not give leadership to the campaign of opposition. By 
March 2012 when the newly passed Act received royal assent, the majority of the 
main professional health associations had declared their opposition to the bill 
(including the Faculty of Public Health, the Royal College of Nursing, the College 
of Emergency Medicine and the vociferous Royal College of GPs) but often not 
until late in the process. Neither the Royal College of Physicians not the Royal 
College of Surgeons in England opposed the bill. Perhaps most surprising was the 
persistent refusal of the leadership of the British Medical Association (BMA) to 
oppose the bill, until late in the campaign. The BMA acts as a trade union for 
doctors and has been historically a highly influential pressure group. It had 
previously indicated its opposition to advancing marketisation and privatisation 
(BMA, 2010). In several instances, professional organisations belatedly shifted to a 
stance of opposition to the bill following coordinated action by their grassroots 
members (see Davis and Wrigley, 2013). 
The campaign to defeat the bill was non-violent and deployed an impressive 
array of actions, techniques and materials. Many of the methods used by 
campaigners were conventional in the sense of participating in the formal 
mechanisms of democratic involvement. KONP organisers produced a number of 
critiques, public letters, leaflets, briefing papers for use nationally or locally in 
raising public awareness. Several waves of large scale letter-writing to 
parliamentarians were coordinated. In addition, a range of more inventive and 
creative approaches was adopted. Local demonstrations and rallies were organised, 
often piggy-backing opposition to the legislation on top of opposition to anticipated 
local service cuts. Several occupations of banks were organised by UKUncut where 
‘hospitals’ were set up; performances of specially written songs, poems and dances 
were staged outside the Department of Health or in other locations. One of the 
really notable features of the campaign was the re-emergence of the protest song, 
disseminated by YouTube, and ranging from the balladic to rap. 38 Degrees 
launched petitions designed to demonstrate extensive opposition to elements of the 
bill. It also raised tens of thousands of pounds from their ‘members’ to commission 
legal advice regarding the implications of the bill for accountability and 
competition law and to run a billboard campaign in London imploring the prime 
minister to listen to the bill’s critics. The Occupy the Bridge demonstration, filming 
of which was widely disseminated through YouTube, attracted a few thousand 
participants and was one of the few campaign actions to achieve coverage in the 
mainstream media. 
Explaining why the bill succeeded despite substantial opposition requires longer 
discussion but, in brief, contributory factors were: the ambiguity of the Labour 
Party’s position given its previous record on marketisation and privatisation and its 
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parliamentary focus; the decision by the major trade unions not to prioritise the 
NHS bill in a context of multiple and simultaneous assaults on the welfare state and 
labour rights; the reluctance of trade unions to forge closer links with the non-
union campaigning organisations, preventing the wider dispersal of the campaign’s 
message; the excessive focus on the parliamentary process at the expense of 
building up distributed grass roots activity across the country; and the hesitancy on 
the part of professional organisations to engage in open political conflict with 
government. Campaigners also singled out the BBC for criticism, particularly its 
framing of the proposals, the absence of BBC expertise available to analyse the 
proposals and the extremely limited coverage given by the BBC to the 
campaigners’ case and actions (Huitson, 2013). 
 
 
9. Concluding discussion: what future for the integrity and sustainability of 
the NHS? 
 
The privileging in this paper of pro-market and pro-privatisation policies serves to 
emphasise and illuminate a particular policy trajectory in which all three main British 
political parties are implicated even if in other aspects of health policy they differ.  
Theorisations of these developments vary. Leys and Player (2011) believe 
policies since 2000 represent a dismantling of the NHS through a ‘plot’ – a plan of 
change the true meaning and consequences of which are hidden from the public 
and parliament. They acknowledge that not all those behind marketisation favoured 
privatisation instead believing that market processes and competition could be 
‘harnessed’ in a ‘managed and planned’ way to improve efficiency and deliver a 
more personalised service. Other actors, including some politicians,  leaders in the 
independent health sector and advisers from neoliberal think-tanks, were from the 
outset privatisers. Either way, Leys and Player suggest, the distinction became less 
relevant over time since marketisation increases the probability of privatisation. 
Klein (2013) believes no privatisation or destruction of the service is underway and 
that critics have exaggerated the importance of structural changes and ignored the 
effect of implementation processes and pre-existing occupational sub-cultures in 
frustrating government ambitions to make real changes. There is perhaps greater 
agreement among policy theorists that ideology especially within the Conservative 
Party plays a stronger role from 2010, with Taylor-Gooby and Stoker (2011) seeing 
the Coalition’s programme of widespread restructuring and shrinkage of provision 
across the welfare state as motivated more by ideological convictions or political 
objectives than by economic or fiscal ones. Hunter (2013) believes ideological 
conviction, the revolving door phenomenon with senior managers passing to and 
fro across public and private boundaries and the close connections of private health 
care companies with management consultancy corporate donors to the 
Conservative Party are all relevant in understanding the drive to push through the 
2011 Health and Social Care Bill. 
Paton’s (2014) analysis is more complex. A more detailed study of policy over 
the period would identify zig-zags and even contradictions, he claims. Paton 
believes health policy since the introduction of the internal market in the 1990s can 
be understood through combining a ‘garbage can’ model of policy with an 
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appreciation of the role of ideology. At various stages, a ‘key idea’ has emerged 
with policy ‘solutions’ being proffered by policy salesmen (advisers and think-tank 
health specialists) in response to ill-defined problems or unasked questions. Thus 
action occurs at a decision point when a powerful interest or advocate succeeds in 
labelling an issue or pseudo issue as a problem which must be solved. These 
decisions are short-termist and can be contradictory. Over time, though, and with 
hindsight, it is possible to see a clear privileging of the market as the main idea in 
reform. Paton posits that there is an overall ideological context, trend or bias in 
reform. The idea of the market has not become dominant because of a rational 
assessment of the evidence but because of a naïve anti-statism, especially a 
rejection of an often misleadingly defined ‘centralist state’. Paton suggests this 
anti-statism was, initially, not primarily driven by a desire to benefit private 
interests but by politicians’ beliefs about what is necessary to be ‘relevant’. Over 
time, private interests have become more entrenched and more recent policy may, 
he concedes, have been more based on their overt role. 
Although the continuity of pro-market and pro-private policies across Labour 
and Coalition governments should not be understated, one significant distinction 
lies in policies on access. Labour sought to enhance access through increasing the 
opening hours of some services (especially in primary care) and through an overall 
expansion in available services underpinned by the most generous funding regime 
in the history of the NHS (Cm 4818, 2000). The policies of the Coalition, however, 
are likely to reduce access over time (Pollock and Price, 2012). In the field of 
public health some services which used to be free at the point of use through the 
NHS have now transferred to local authorities and may be chargeable, impinging 
on access. Where Labour’s market retained the legal duty of the Secretary of State 
to provide a comprehensive health service (operationalised through an extensive 
list of services), under the Coalition’s market neither the Secretary of State nor the 
local CCGs have a legal duty to secure comprehensive health care. Instead, CCGs 
can decide what it is ‘reasonable’ to provide for the patients on their lists (Pollock 
and Price, 2012). Without a legal responsibility to provide comprehensive care, 
there can be no corresponding entitlement to it on the part of members of the 
public. This is where levels of funding for the service become important. Much of 
the additional expense of Labour’s market was offset by very high increases in 
annual funding: 5.5% on average between 1997 and 2009 after inflation (Appleby, 
2015). Under the Coalition (and now Conservative) government, however, 
austerity funding has afforded the NHS just 1% average annual real terms increases 
challenging the service to find over 3% annual cuts or efficiencies to deal with 
growing need and other cost pressures (Adams et al, 2012). As funding constraints 
bite, it is likely that gaps in provision will open up and patients will be faced with a 
choice between paying privately for the unfunded health care they need or going 
without. Thus, reforms apparently designed to change the market structure of the 
health system could usher in a change in both the coverage and the funding base of 
the health system 
The gradual move to a defined package of care which may be the current 
direction of travel will allow politicians to claim NHS care is still free at the point 
of use but in reality citizens’ entitlements will have been radically altered. 
Additionally where Labour’s Primary Care Trusts commissioned services for the 
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whole resident population in a defined geographical patch, it can be argued 
(Pollock and Price, 2012) that the new CCGs are legally required to purchase care 
only for those on their lists and to provide no more than emergency care for those 
not on their lists. Thus, in terms of the founding principles of the NHS, 
universality, comprehensiveness, the allocation of health care according to need 
and access to health care free at the point of delivery, all appear to be under threat. 
The NHS is run at arm’s length through a quango, NHS England (in theory at 
least). Neither CCGs as commissioners nor providing organisations are accountable 
to the Secretary of State. Although health ministers may still be questioned in 
Parliament there is a growing range of activities in which ministers no longer 
intervene. There are also growing areas of data which are no longer collected 
nationally and which are therefore more difficult for academics, journalists or 
members of the public to obtain. Private organisations are not bound by the 2000 
Freedom of Information Act and thus cannot be held to account in this way 
although public agencies which contract their services are required to make 
available to the public certain information about the contract. The resources private 
companies expend on providing services including bed numbers and staffing levels 
and details of the organisation of their work are protected from public scrutiny and 
often come to light only when something goes wrong. Because public bodies 
themselves are engaged in commercially sensitive activities they too may seek to 
keep certain information out of the public domain. Local health scrutiny 
committees cannot expect to be given commercially sensitive information. Thus 
market competition and commercialisation have weakened the accountability of the 
service. 
The sustainability of the NHS is vulnerable for political rather than financial 
reasons. Financially, the service itself is not unfeasibly expensive. Department of 
Health expenditure in England for 2014/2015 was roughly £113bn22. The Nuffield 
Trust (Adams et al, 2012) has calculated that the service needs a real terms increase 
of 4% annually to continue to deliver services on the current basis in a context of 
health specific inflation, patient expectations and growing need (arising from 
changes in size and structure of the population changes, the profile of illness and 
technological innovation). Taking onto consideration average economic growth of 
around 2.0-2.5% each year (OBR, 2015), tax measures to raise the remaining 
necessary funds are entirely conceivable. The idea that the NHS is a funding ‘black 
hole’ is a fallacy.  
The main threats to the NHS are political. One aspect of this is talking up a 
crisis in the sustainability of the service by invoking concerns around the ageing 
population, the changing burden of disease, funding constraints, lifestyle-related 
risks and rising public expectations (e.g. NHS England, 2013). Several 
organisations have suggested that the introduction of charges needs to be at least 
considered (e.g. NHS Confederation, 2013; Cawston and Corry, 2013) and/or that 
the service can be sustained only through radical restructuring which in practice 
entails the closure of whole hospital departments and the loss of thousands of beds 
(e.g. NHS England, 2014) and this policy is being pursued in many local health 
_____________ 
 
22  The UK GDP is £1.823 trillion as estimated in April 2015 (IMF, 2015) Report for selected countries. 
International Monetary Fund.  
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economies. However, this is misleading. The additional revenue needed for the 
service annually is relatively modest and the NHS has been recognised as one of 
the most cost effective health services among developed countries (Davis et al, 
2014). The NHS already has one of the lowest bed-per-head-of-population rates in 
the developed world (OECD, 2014). Nonetheless, alongside a drip-drip of negative 
news stories, repeated claims that the service cannot continue without radical 
change contribute to undermining public confidence in the affordability and 
sustainability of the NHS and help convince the public that change is not only 
inevitable but also desirable. 
Policies pursued by government themselves contribute to undermining the 
service. The creation and retention of a market system reflects a deliberate policy 
choice to increase costs because of the infrastructure required to run the service as 
a market. The election of PFI as the means by which new facilities will be procured 
again reflects a political choice for a high cost option. Decisions about the funding 
level for the service are clearly political as are decisions about the structure of the 
tax system through which government revenues are raised. The Conservative 
government, elected in May 2015, has signalled its wish to move to a ‘higher wage, 
lower tax, lower welfare country’ (Osborne, 2015). Tax revenues in 2014/15 as a 
proportion of GDP were lower than in every year in the decade leading to the 
financial crash (HM Treasury, 2015:5). Policy decisions to reduce the tax take 
relative to what it would have raised (and to hold public sector wages down 
compounding the problem) compromise the ability of government to sustain the 
funding of its public services including the health service. 
Looking to the policy framework beyond the UK, the impact of successive 
waves of marketisation has been to re-define health care as an economic activity 
and thus make it potentially vulnerable to the provisions of international trade and 
competition law. For instance, the new NHS market is overseen by the sector-
specific economic regulator and the more generic UK competition authorities. 
Thus, it is likely that the NHS would fall within the purview of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated between the EU and the 
US and enthusiastically supported by the main political parties at the time of 
writing. These provisions currently prevent preferential treatment being given to 
NHS providers and potentially prevent the renationalisation of the service where 
corporate interests are considered to be damaged by such a policy (Hilary, 2014). 
Overall, then, the NHS in England looks as if it will continue to reduce the 
proportion of the service which is publicly provided and may make modest steps 
towards a stronger element for private funding. Both marketisation and 
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